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[More than a decade has passed since the landmark High Court decision in 
Marion’s Case,1 where the Court authorised the sterilisation of a young woman who 
suffered from a disability. Recently, the principles established in that case were 
applied by the Family Court in a different context – for the provision of hormonal 
treatment for a 13 year old child,2 some aspects of which are irreversible. Previ-
ously, the Family Court had authorised gender reassignment surgery for a child 
suffering from a physical, congenital condition,3 but notably in Re Alex, the subject 
child suffered no identified physical condition indicating treatment, but from an 
identified psychological condition, gender identity dysphoria.  
 
This article considers the issues raised by recent applications of the principles 
relating to the capacity of children to consent to medical treatment, including the 
decision in Re Alex and the application of those principles to transgender and 
intersex children.  While not all children or adults who identify as transgender or 
intersex choose the long and difficult path of gender reassignment, some will 
choose surgical gender reassignment or hormonal treatment at some stage of their 
lives.  In cases where it is proposed that a minor undergo such treatment, the appli-
cation of the principles of child consent poses particular difficulties.] 
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I BACKGROUND – THE CAPACITY OF CHILDREN TO CONSENT 
TO MEDICAL TREATMENT 
 
It is necessary to begin a consideration of medical consent issues relating to chil-
dren with an examination of the House of Lords’ decision in Gillick,4 because that 
decision was endorsed by the High Court in Marion’s Case.  In Gillick, the De-
partment of Health and Social Security issued a circular to area health authorities 
advising doctors in relation to the prescription of contraceptive treatment to female 
minors under the age of 16.  The circular indicated that although it would be usual 
and preferable to obtain parental consent to contraceptive treatment, in certain 
special circumstances it would be permissible to do so without the need for contact 
with, or permission from, a parent. 
 
Mrs Gillick, as the mother of five daughters under the age of 16, sought assurance 
from the relevant Health Authority that her daughters would not be given contra-
ceptive advice or treatment without her consent.  When the Health Authority re-
fused to provide such assurance, Mrs Gillick brought an action against the Health 
Authority and the Department seeking a declaration that the advice contained in the 
circular was unlawful on the basis that: 
• it advised doctors to cause or encourage unlawful sexual intercourse with 
a minor (an offence); or  
• it encouraged a doctor to become an accessory to unlawful sexual inter-
course with a minor (also an offence); or  
• that the provision of contraceptive advice to a minor was unlawful as be-
ing inconsistent with the plaintiff’s parental rights. 
 
In part, Mrs Gillick’s case turned on the accuracy of the proposition that a child 
under the age of 16 years is incapable of giving consent to contraceptive treatment.  
The trial judge refused to grant the declarations sought by Mrs Gillick,5 but that 
decision was overturned on appeal.6  The Department appealed to the House of 
Lords. 
 
By majority, the House of Lords found in favour of the Health Authority.  They 
found that although it would certainly be unusual, in circumstances where a child is 
of sufficient intelligence and maturity, to understand fully the nature of the treat-
ment being administered and to make a decision about that treatment, the child is 
capable of consenting to the treatment.  Parental rights in relation to minors are not 
absolute; a parent begins by having control when a child is very young, but the right 
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dwindles as the child becomes older or no longer needs protection, until it becomes 
little more than a right to advise.7 
 
The decision of the House of Lords in Gillick was endorsed by the High Court of 
Australia in Marion’s Case.8  The parents of Marion (not her real name), a 14-year-
old girl suffering from mental retardation, severe deafness and epilepsy, sought a 
court order authorising the sterilisation of their daughter or, in the alternative, a 
declaration that is was lawful for them to consent to the sterilisation.  The purpose 
of the proposed procedure was to prevent pregnancy and menstruation, which had 
psychological and behavioural consequences for Marion, and to stabilise hormonal 
influxes for the purposes of eliminating consequential stress and behavioural re-
sponses.9 
 
The various judgments in Marion’s Case addressed three main issues: the capacity 
of a child to consent to medical treatment, the scope of parental consent to medical 
treatment and the power of the court to authorise medical treatment for a child.  
Although there was no question that Marion did not, and could never have, the 
capacity to consent to medical treatment, the majority of the Court saw fit to en-
dorse the principle established in Gillick – that a child is capable of giving consent 
to medical treatment where the child is of sufficient intelligence and maturity to 
understand fully what is proposed.10  On the other hand, Brennan J doubted whether 
Gillick afforded sufficient recognition to “the primacy of parental responsibility”.11 
 
The real issue in Marion’s Case was the ability of parents to consent to sterilisation 
of their child in circumstances where that sterilisation was not required for the 
purposes of saving the life of the child or preventing serious harm.  In determining 
this issue, the majority drew a distinction, albeit reluctantly, between therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic sterilisation.  Therapeutic sterilisation is performed either for 
the purpose of, or as a by-product of, surgery to treat a malfunction or disease.12  
Non-therapeutic sterilisation, then, is sterilisation carried out for another purpose.  
The test was also endorsed by Brennan J13 and Deane J.14 
 
The High Court, with the exception of Deane J, held that parents could never con-
sent to sterilisation for non-therapeutic purposes.  Justice Deane would have al-
lowed parental consent for non-therapeutic sterilisation only in a narrowly-defined 
set of circumstances, namely:15 
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(i) where the child is so profoundly intellectually disabled that she will never 
be able to have a mature human relationship involving informed sexual in-
tercourse, of responsible procreation or of caring for an infant;  
(ii) where the surgery is necessary to avoid grave and unusual problems and 
suffering associated with menstruation;  
(iii) where the surgery is a treatment of last resort; and  
(iv) where there is medical advice from a multidisciplinary team acting on the 
basis of appropriate reports.   
 
These requirements were considered by Deane J to distinguish ordinary non-
therapeutic sterilisation from sterilisation that is obviously required according to 
general community standards.16 
 
II OVERSEAS AUTHORITIES 
 
It is relevant before embarking on a discussion of the principles of child consent 
and their applicability to the transgender or intersex child to consider two cases 
from the United Kingdom dealing with the capacity of a child to refuse consent to 
medical treatment.  To the authors’ knowledge, this issue has not arisen for judicial 
consideration in Australia.  In both cases, the English courts limited the Gillick 
principle in two important ways.  First, they found that a child who is Gillick com-
petent, while able to consent to medical treatment, is not similarly able to refuse 
consent to medical treatment, and in circumstances where a parent authorises treat-
ment against the wishes of a minor, the parental consent will be sufficient to author-
ise the treatment.  The second limitation was a finding that even where a child is 
Gillick competent, the Court in its exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction retains 
the right to override either a consent or a refusal of the child to medical treatment 
where that is in the child's best interests. 
 
A Re R 
Re R involved a 15-year-old ward of the state who was admitted to a treatment 
centre.17  She had a disturbed childhood and experienced periods of erratic and 
violent behaviour interspersed with periods of lucidity and rationality.  During an 
episode of the latter description, she expressed her wishes to a counsellor that she 
did not wish to take the drugs that the unit personnel wanted to give her and had 
given her on previous occasions.  The local authority commenced wardship pro-
ceedings and applied for leave for the unit to administer medication regardless of 
R’s consent or absence thereof. 
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Although a consideration of the scope of parental authority was not relevant to the 
decision, Lord Donaldson considered the principle from Gillick and found that it did 
not extend to a right reposed in a minor to refuse consent to medical treatment.  
With regard to consent, he used the analogy of child and parent as keyholders, each 
of whom was entitled to “unlock the door” to medical treatment of the minor.  In 
circumstances where the child refused consent to medical treatment, the parents 
could still override that consent and authorise medical treatment.18  To find other-
wise would result in doctors being faced with the “intolerable dilemma” of having 
to determine who possessed a right of consent at any particular time, with the threat 
of being sued if a wrong decision was made.19 
 
The Court found that R was not Gillick competent, on the basis that she was only 
competent for periods of time before lapsing into phases of irrationality and vio-
lence.  However, the Court still went on to consider the power of the Court in rela-
tion to a child determined to be Gillick competent.  The Court found that it could, in 
exercise of its wardship or statutory jurisdiction in relation to minors, override the 
decision of a Gillick competent minor to consent or refuse treatment.20  In the cir-
cumstances it was held to be in the best interests of R that the unit be authorised to 
administer any treatment to R that it considered necessary. 
 
B Re W 
Re W concerned a 16-year-old girl suffering from anorexia nervosa.21  W, who was 
found by the trial judge to be Gillick competent, was being treated at a facility for 
patients with eating disorders.  Her condition was deteriorating steadily, to the 
extent that doctors feared she might soon suffer damage to her reproductive system 
and danger to her life if treatment were not administered.  W refused consent to her 
being moved to an alternative treatment centre in London where a more rigorous 
program of treatment would be administered. 
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the court, in exercising its unlimited 
inherent jurisdiction in relation to minors, could override the wishes of a competent 
child in the best interests of the child, objectively considered.22  The Court also 
found that a minor did not have a power of veto in relation to treatment authorised 
by someone with parental responsibilities for the minor.  A power of veto was not 
provided by s 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 196923 and although the issue of 
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parental power to veto was not at issue in Re W, the Court also doubted that the 
principle in Gillick extended to allowing a child an absolute right of refusal in 
relation to medical treatment.24  Lord Donaldson, regretting his use of the keyholder 
analogy in Re R, used the analogy of a “legal flak jacket” which would protect the 
doctor from litigation in relation to a medical procedure, whether provided by the 
child or by someone with parental responsibilities.25  Despite the fact that W was 
Gillick competent, the Court authorised the proposed treatment on the basis that it 
was in her best interests, given the serious consequences to her health if treatment 
were not administered. 
 
III CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT OF THE            
TRANSGENDER OR INTERSEX CHILD 
 
A Re A26 – Surgical treatment for congenital adrenal  
  hyperplasia27 
 
1 Relevant facts 
A, a 14-year-old child, was diagnosed at birth with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, a 
disorder which resulted in the over-production of male sex hormones which causes 
masculinisation of the genitalia.28 A was assessed as a genetic female with an ex-
treme degree of masculinisation.  As an infant, A had genital reconstruction surgery 
to give him a feminine appearance.  He was also given hormone replacement treat-
ment to prevent further masculinisation.29 
                                                                                                                                 
this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any 
consent for it from his parent or guardian. 
(2) In this section ‘surgical, medical or dental treatment’ includes any procedure undertaken 
for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section applies to any procedure (including, in particu-
lar, the administration of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to 
that treatment. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any consent which would 
have been effective if this section had not been enacted. 
24
 Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627, 633 (Lord Donaldson MR), 642–3 (Balcombe LJ). 
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 In Re A (1993) 16 Fam LR 715. 
27
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The level of the hormone therapy, however, was inadequate, and A suffered further 
masculinisation.  This was accompanied by a change in A’s attitude, so that he 
preferred to be male. 
 
In 1993, A’s mother brought an application before the Family Court seeking au-
thorisation for A to undergo surgical treatment. In particular, authorisation was 
sought for: 
• bilateral mastectomies;  
• a hysterectomy;  
• an oophorectomy (removal of ovaries);  
• unfolding of the clitoris to increase its length and to relieve pain 
caused by erections; 
• closure of the labia to create the appearance of a scrotum; and 
• insertion of prosthetic testes.30 
 
 
2 The decision of the Court 
(a)  Whether A was competent to consent to the proposed treatement 
 
Referring to the High Court’s approval (in Marion’s Case) of the House of Lords’ 
decision in Gillick, Mushin J noted that a minor is capable of giving informed 
consent when he or she ‘achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed’.31  On the evidence, the 
Court found that although A understood the problem and, in general, the proposed 
resolution to the problem, he did not have ‘sufficient capacity and maturity to fully 
appreciate the matter and to assess the options available to him’.32 
 
(b)  Whether A’s parent was able to consent to the proposed treatment 
 
The Court then turned to consider whether the proposed treatment was outside the 
scope of A’s parent to consent to on behalf of A.  The Court noted that the purpose 
of intervention was to assign to A male sexual organs, and sterilisation would be 
incidental to the treatment.  The Court concluded that the decision to proceed with 
the proposed treatment did not fall within the ordinary scope of parental power to 
consent to medical treatment, noting first the significant risk of making the wrong 
decision about what was in A’s best interests and secondly that the consequences of 
the decision were particularly grave.33  
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(c)  Whether the Court ought to consent to the proposed treatment 
 
The Court then addressed the question of whether the consent should be granted. 
Noting that the most important concern was A’s emotional and psychological state, 
the Court found it was clear that the treating experts regarded the proposed treat-
ment as highly desirable in A’s interests.  Further, the Court noted the probability of 
very serious negative consequences to A if the application were rejected.  In the 
circumstances, the Court concluded that it was “overwhelmingly” in A’s interests to 
accede to the application.34  The Court made final orders authorising all of the 
aspects of the proposed treatment, as well as any further or other necessary and 
consequential procedures to give effect to the treatment of the condition of congeni-
tal adrenal hyperplasia.35 
 
 
B Re Alex – Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria 
 
1 Relevant facts 
Alex was born overseas, the only child of his36 married parents.  As a young child 
he was very close to his father, who died suddenly when Alex was five or six years 
old. Several years later, Alex’s mother re-married and the family moved to Austra-
lia.  Alex’s step-father had children from a prior relationship who lived with the 
family.  Alex had difficulties adjusting to his new situation and demonstrated vio-
lence both at school and at home towards his step-siblings on a number of occa-
sions.  
 
When Alex was 10 years old, a child protection alert was made to the relevant 
government department, which resulted in final orders being made assigning 
guardianship responsibility for Alex to a government department.  Since those 
orders, Alex had been living with his aunt, apart from a three month period during 
which he was placed in foster care.  Alex had had no contact with his mother, and 
although his mother was served with the application, she did not seek to be heard on 
the application.37 
 
It was common ground in the evidence presented before the Court that Alex had: 
• no ambiguity in sexual characteristics; 
• normal female chromosomes; 
• hormone levels typical of an adolescent female;  
                                                        
34
 Ibid 722. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Nicholson CJ noted in Re Alex that Alex wanted to be referred to as a male, and adopted that terminol-
ogy in his judgment: (2004) 180 FLR 89, 94.  We have done the same for all references in this article. 
37
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• female reproductive organs;38 and 
• a long-standing, unwavering and present identification as a male.39 
 
Alex was diagnosed with “gender identity dysphoria”,40 a definition of which is 
provided by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edn) 
(DSM-IV): 
 
A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for 
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex). In children the dis-
turbance is manifested by four (or more) of the following: 
§ repeated stated desire to be, or insistence that he/she is, the other 
sex; 
§ in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating female attire; 
in girls, insistence on only wearing stereotypical masculine cloth-
ing; 
§ strong and persistent preferences for cross-sex roles in make-
believe play or persistent fantasies of being the other sex; 
§ intense desire to participate in the stereotypical games and pas-
times of the other sex; 
§ strong preference for playmates of the other sex. 
 
2 Application to the Family Court 
The applicant, Alex’s guardian, filed an originating application41 in the Family 
Court seeking, by way of final orders, a declaration pursuant to s 67ZC(1) and (2) 
of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act) that the applicant42 be authorised to 
consent on Alex’s behalf to certain medical treatment. The respondents to the 
application were Alex’s aunt and mother43 and, at the Court’s invitation, the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (the Commission) intervened without 
objection pursuant to s 92 of the Act.44  The application originally sought authorisa-
tion only for the first stage of the treatment, but the applicant requested the Court to 
consider the treatment as a whole process and the final orders related to a single 
treatment plan incorporating all stages of treatment.  The relevant medical treatment 
was: 
(a) that Alex be administered a combination of oestrogen and progestogen 
on a continuous basis until he turned 16;  
                                                        
38
 Ibid 103. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Alex was diagnosed as such in two reports: one of Professor P, an Associate Professor in the Depart-
ment of Psychiatry at a university faculty of medicine and a consultant child psychiatrist at a hospital for 
children, and one of Dr N, a Consultant Psychiatrist and specialist in child and adolescent psychiatry, 
particularly gender issues. This diagnosis was confirmed by the evidence of Ms R, Alex’s caseworker. 
41
 The application was filed on 12 December 2003. 
42
 The specified person being the Secretary of the government department with guardianship responsibil-
ity for Alex. 
43
 Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 93. 
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 Ibid 93–94. 
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(b) ongoing psychiatric assessment for Alex; and  
(c) that, after Alex reached the age of 16, he be treated with LRHR ana-
logue and testosterone administered either in oral form, by monthly in-
jection or by six-monthly subcutaneous implant. 
 
The administration of the pill (the treatment referred to at (a) above) would result in 
the suppression of Alex’s menses.  This aspect of the treatment was completely 
reversible, although continuous treatment for three years might have an irreversible 
effect on Alex’s ovarian function and fertility.  The treatment referred to at (c) 
above involved the administration of LRHR analogue, a drug which suppresses the 
release of gonadotrophins from the pituitary gland, and would suppress all ovarian 
menstruation.  The administration of testosterone, a male sex hormone, would have 
certain irreversible effects such as deepening of Alex’s voice, the promotion of 
facial and body hair, muscular development and enlargement of the clitoris.45  
Authorisation was not sought for any treatment with irreversible effects to be ad-
ministered until Alex reached the age of 16. 
 
3 The decision of the Court 
In January 2004, pending final judgment, the Court made interim orders authorising 
Alex’s guardian to consent to the administration of oestrogen and progestogen 
(commonly known as the pill) on a continuous basis, with the consequence that 
Alex began secondary school known as a male.  The Court’s judgment was deliv-
ered in full on 13 April 2004. 
 
(a) Jurisdiction 
 
At the outset, the Court noted that s 67ZC of the Act provided the statutory basis of 
the Court’s jurisdiction to approve or refuse permission for special medical proce-
dures.46 Section 67ZC provides: 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction that a court has under this Part in relation to 
children, the court also has jurisdiction to make orders relating to the wel-
fare of children.  
(2) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1) in relation to a 
child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount 
consideration. 
 
This section provides the Family Court with the parens patriae or welfare jurisdic-
tion explained by the High Court in Marion’s Case.47 
 
                                                        
45
 Ibid 94. 
46
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(b)  Whether Alex was competent to consent to the proposed treatment  
 
The Court then stated that the question of whether a child is competent to consent to 
medical treatment required consideration of whether the child had achieved a suffi-
cient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what 
was proposed.48  The Court considered the evidence before it, particularly those 
aspects of the psychiatric evidence which went to Alex’s comprehension of the 
treatment and its effects.  Noting that although Alex may have had a general under-
standing of what was proposed and its effect, the Court stated that it was quite 
another thing to conclude that Alex had “sufficient maturity to fully understand the 
grave nature and effects of the proposed treatment”.49  The Court concluded that 
Alex was not competent to consent to the treatment on his own behalf. 
 
(c) Whether Alex’s guardian was able to consent to the proposed treatment 
 
Having concluded that Alex did not have capacity to consent to the treatment, the 
Court went on to consider whether the nature of the proposed procedure was one 
that required the consent of the Court.50  The Court expressed the view that the 
requirement of court authorisation was not limited to treatment involving surgical 
intervention.51  Noting the physiological and psychological basis of gender identity 
dysphoria, the Court concluded that the current state of knowledge did not support a 
finding that the treatment would be for a “malfunction” or “disease” as explained by 
the majority in Marion’s Case.52  The Court concluded, however, that the nature of 
the proposed treatment was such that court authorisation was required. 
 
(d) Whether the Court ought to consent to the proposed treatment 
 
The Court went on to consider whether it ought to grant the authorisation to consent 
to the proposed treatment, noting that some aspects of the treatment had reversible 
effects and some irreversible.  The Court stated that where reversible medical 
treatment is in specific anticipation of irreversible medical treatment which would 
require court authorisation, it would ordinarily be prudent, as in this case, for the 
application to be made pursuant to s 67ZC at the outset of the clinical interven-
tion.53  After a summary of the expert evidence in the case, the Court considered the 
‘Re Marion’ matters: 
(i) the particular condition of the child which required the procedure or 
treatment; 
(ii) the nature of the procedure or treatment proposed; 
                                                        
48
 Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 116, referring to Secretary, Department of Health and Community  
Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218, 237-8. 
49
 Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 118. 
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 Ibid120. 
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(iii) the reasons for which it is proposed the procedure or treatment be car-
ried out; 
(iv) the alternative courses of treatment that are available in relation to the 
condition; 
(v) the desirability of and effect of authorising the procedure for treatment 
proposed rather than available alternatives; 
(vi) the physical effects on the child and the psychological and social im-
plications for the child of authorising the proposed procedure or 
treatment or not authorising the proposed procedure or treatment; 
(vii) the nature and degree of any risk to the child or young person of 
authorising the proposed procedure or treatment or not authorising the 
proposed procedure or treatment; and 
(viii) the views (if any) expressed by the guardian(s) of the child, a person 
who is entitled to custody of the child, a person who is responsible for 
the daily care and control of the child and the child himself, to the 
proposed procedure or treatment and to any alternative procedure or 
treatment.54 
 
Further, the Court considered whether to make an order which would be least likely  
to lead to the institution of further proceedings (as required by s 68F of the Act) and 
therefore concluded that the authorisation for all stages of the treatment proposed 
ought to be granted.55  The Court justified the authorisation of all stages of the 
treatment on the basis that it was least likely to lead to the institution of further 
proceedings, but kept the proceedings on foot and adjourned in the event that a 
party could re-open the matter if Alex’s situation was altered.56 
 
IV COMMENT: CAPACITY OF THE TRANSGENDER OR INTERSEX 
CHILD TO CONSENT (OR REFUSE CONSENT) TO TREATMENT 
 
There are a number of issues that arise from a consideration of the principles of 
child consent in the context of transgender and intersex children.  What follows is a 
discussion of three issues: 
 
1. Despite the Court’s endorsement of Gillick, are there in fact some types of 
treatment which are so serious in nature that a minor can never consent to 
them?  Would gender reassignment and irreversible hormonal therapy fall 
into this category? 
2. Should a distinction be drawn between the capacity of a minor to consent 
to medical treatment on the one hand and her or his capacity to refuse con-
sent to medical treatment on the other? 
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3. How should the principles of child consent be applied in the special con-
text of treatment for the transgender or intersex child, given the particular 
consequences which may result both from administering treatment and 
withholding treatment? 
 
 
A  Can a minor consent to treatment for the purposes of 
gender reassignment? 
The first issue for consideration is the question of whether there are some types of 
treatment that are so serious in nature that a minor can never give an effective 
consent for that treatment.  The principle enunciated by the House of Lords in 
Gillick and endorsed by the High Court in Marion’s Case is that a child is capable 
of giving consent to medical treatment in circumstances where the child possesses 
sufficient intelligence and maturity to understand fully the treatment that is being 
proposed.  In Marion’s Case there was no suggestion that the subject child, who 
suffered from a severe intellectual disability, had (or ever would have) the capacity 
to consent to her proposed sterilisation.  However, Re A and Re Alex concerned two 
children with normal intellectual capacity who wished to undergo medical treat-
ment, some of the consequences of which were irreversible: Alex for the purpose of 
changing his biological sex and A for the purpose of choosing between the ambigu-
ous sexual characteristics he was born with.57 
 
In both cases the Court found that although the children possessed a general under-
standing of the kinds of treatment that were being proposed, they did not possess 
the requisite intelligence and maturity to give them the capacity to consent to treat-
ment.  However, an examination of the reasons for this finding in Re Alex evidences 
more of a concern about the propriety of a 13-year-old being responsible for such a 
serious decision than a true inquiry into Alex’s capacity to consent to medical 
treatment.   
 
The Court found that the question of Alex’s capacity to consent was an academic 
question, given that the expert evidence as to the proposed treatment was in accor-
dance with Alex’s wishes, nevertheless the Court still gave consideration to the 
issue.  The judgment refers to the evidence of only three people on this point: Mr T 
(who prepared the family report), Professor P (an Associate Professor in the De-
partment of Psychiatry at a university) and Dr N (Consultant Psychiatrist and spe-
cialist in child and adolescent psychiatry).  Professor P, in particular, reported that 
Alex fully understood the mechanism of action for the proposed hormone treatment 
and its side effects and benefits.  Both Mr T and Professor P indicated, however, 
                                                        
57
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that they did not consider it appropriate that at age 13 Alex should be wholly re-
sponsible for the decision to undergo hormone treatment.58 
 
Although holding that a finding of Gillick competence did not preclude a court from 
authorising medical treatment of a minor against her wishes, the judgments in Re W 
evidence a similar reluctance to accept the competence of the minor in question.  
Despite the trial judge, who heard from W, concluding that W was competent, the 
Court still felt inclined to doubt whether W was truly Gillick competent.  Lord 
Donaldson found that ‘it is a feature of anorexia nervosa that it is capable of de-
stroying the ability to make an informed choice.  It creates a compulsion to refuse 
treatment or only to accept treatment which is likely to be ineffective.’59 
 
One can understand the reluctance of the courts to allow the kinds of treatment 
being considered (or potentially refused) in these cases to be administered on the 
basis of the child’s consent alone or withheld solely on the basis of the child’s 
refusal.  However, if it truly is the case that some treatment is of such a serious 
nature, or the refusal of treatment would have such serious consequences, that a 
competent child’s right of consent or refusal should not be absolute, then that 
should be enunciated clearly as a matter of legal principle. 
 
The Court hinted at such a proposition in Re Alex.  In the course of argument, the 
Commission made a submission that a court has no power to override either the 
informed consent or informed refusal of a competent child to medical treatment or, 
if such a power does exist, the court should not as a matter of discretion exercise 
that power except perhaps in extreme circumstances.60 The Court doubted the 
correctness of that proposition and went on to state, ‘It is highly questionable 
whether a 13 year old could ever be regarded as having the capacity for the latter, 
and this situation may well continue until the young person reaches maturity.’61 
 
The suggestion here is that there are some types of medical treatment which are so 
serious that even a child who has a sufficient understanding and maturity to under-
stand fully the nature of the treatment and the consequences of her or his decision, 
should not be allowed an absolute right to consent to that treatment.  Treatment in 
the nature of gender reassignment surgery and treatment preparatory to that, which 
is serious in nature and irreversible in consequence, would probably fall into this 
category. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the power of the courts is unlimited in their exercise of 
parens patriae jurisdiction.  Even where a child assessed to be competent has given 
consent to a medical procedure, a court has the power to override that competent 
consent where that is considered to be in the child's best interests.62  The English 
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cases considered above appear to reflect the idea that although competent adults are 
entitled to consent to or refuse treatment as they see fit, regardless of the conse-
quences, there should be some overarching protection of a Gillick competent child 
to shield her or him from the consequences of an unfettered right to decide whether 
or not to accept medical treatment.  For example, in Re W, Balcombe LJ stated that 
in exercising its ultimate jurisdiction over children the child's wishes would be a 
material consideration, however: 
 
there comes a point at which the court, while not disregarding the child's 
wishes can override them in the child's own best interests, objectively con-
sidered.  Clearly such a point will have come if the child is seeking to re-
fuse treatment in circumstances which will in all probability lead to the 
death of the child or to severe permanent injury.63 
 
The language of s 67ZC of the Act would appear to support the existence of a 
similarly unlimited jurisdiction in the Family Court of Australia.  Indeed, it has 
been noted that the United Kingdom position probably applies in Australia.64  In 
Marion’s Case, the majority stated that ‘more contemporary descriptions of the 
parens patriae jurisdiction over infants invariably accept that in theory there is no 
limitation upon the jurisdiction’.65  They went on to note, however, that the jurisdic-
tion springs from the direct responsibility of the Crown for those who cannot look 
after themselves.66  Given that this is the source of the parens patriae jurisdiction, it 
would seem illogical for it to extend to overriding the wishes of a competent minor. 
More consideration needs to be given to the issue of whether a child is capable of 
consenting to serious and irreversible treatment such as treatment for the purposes 
of gender reassignment, or whether there are certain procedures that only a court 
can consent to for a minor regardless of whether the minor understands fully the 
nature and consequences of the treatment.  Either through legislation, or through 
judicial decision, the role of the court needs to be clarified: is its task simply to 
verify that a child has the requisite capacity to make the decision in question, or is 
the role of the court to ensure that the best interests of the child are always served, 
regardless of the competent child’s wishes? 
 
B  Consent to treatment vs refusal of consent 
Another notable feature in the cases and jurisprudence concerning child capacity to 
consent to medical treatment is the question of whether a distinction should be 
drawn between capacity to consent to treatment on the one hand and the capacity to 
refuse consent to treatment on the other (as is suggested in some of the United 
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Kingdom decisions discussed above).  The rationale for drawing a distinction be-
tween the two is the serious consequences that may result where a child is found 
competent to refuse consent to life-saving medical treatment, for example by refus-
ing consent to a blood transfusion on religious grounds. 
 
Competent adults, of course, have the ability to consent to, and refuse, a range of 
medical treatments even where the consequences of that may be serious injury or 
death.  The refusal of life-saving medical treatment on any ground and for any 
reason is the clearest example.  Debates about arbitrary age limits for activities such 
as voting and driving draw on the argument that although some children are un-
doubtedly of sufficient intelligence and maturity to vote, some adults do not appear 
to be.  It is generally understood that arbitrary age qualifications such as 18 (for 
voting and drinking alcohol) are largely a matter of practical convenience, as it 
would be logistically impossible to assess each individual to determine her or his 
maturity and intellectual fitness for these activities.  Considerations of practical 
convenience are, of course, irrelevant to the issue of capacity to consent to medical 
treatment of a serious nature, which is not common and also turns very much on the 
circumstances of the particular individual seeking treatment, as well as the nature of 
the treatment itself. 
 
There remains to be considered in the Australian context whether any distinction 
should be drawn between a child’s capacity to consent to medical treatment and a 
child’s capacity to refuse consent.  The established position in the United Kingdom 
is that a Gillick competent child may effectively consent to medical treatment, 
however a refusal of treatment may be overridden by the consent of someone with 
parental responsibility. This finding is notwithstanding the proposition that ‘in logic 
there can be no difference between an ability to consent to treatment and an ability 
to refuse treatment’.67  However there is a difference between the two and the 
distinction lies in the importance of “medical ethics” and the role it plays in the 
administration of treatment.  When a child, or any person for that matter, “consents” 
to medical treatment there is added protection for that person in that the consent 
does not impose any positive obligation on a medical practitioner to administer the 
treatment or perform the procedure being consented to. A medical practitioner 
always has a choice as to whether to perform a procedure and is not obligated to 
treat a patient in circumstances where the practitioner believes that is not in the 
person's best interests.68  Lord Donaldson made reference to this when he stated in 
his summary of principles in Re W that ‘[n]o question of a minor consenting to or 
refusing medical treatment arises unless and until a medical or dental practitioner 
advises such treatment and is willing to undertake it.’69 
 
Consideration of the role of medical ethics has been a feature of some of the judg-
ments referred to above. For example, in Re W, Lord Donaldson considered it 
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“inconceivable” that a doctor would proceed with a serious procedure (a transplant 
operation being the example used) unless both child and parents gave their consent 
to the procedure.  Lord Donaldson pointed out that a doctor has a professional duty 
to act in the best interests of the patient and to advise the patient on that basis.  As 
an additional example, Lord Donaldson and Balcombe LJ indicated that, taking into 
account medical ethics, there was no real possibility that an abortion would be 
carried out on a minor against her wishes, unless the procedure was truly in her best 
interests.70 
 
The same inherent safeguard does not apply to a refusal of treatment.  In circum-
stances where treatment is objectively necessary in the patient’s best interests, but 
the person will not consent to that treatment, the harm results from the absence of 
treatment rather than from the proposed treatment itself.  Therefore, it is potentially 
more significant to allow a child an absolute right to refuse medical treatment than 
it is to allow the child to consent to medical treatment, as the consent to treatment 
will only have effect if there is a doctor who is willing to administer the treatment 
or perform the procedure. 
 
It has been suggested that, where a child is found competent to consent to medical 
treatment, the child’s reasons for refusing medical treatment should be taken into 
consideration so that, for instance, a decision to refuse treatment which would only 
prolong a painful and incurable condition should be regarded as a competent one 
while a decision to refuse treatment on religious grounds would be regarded as 
invalid as being objectively unreasonable.71  The authors do not consider that there 
is much to recommend this proposal.  An appraisal of competence is not and should 
not be concerned with the reasons for decisions but rather with the capacity of the 
person making the decision to understand the nature of the proposed treatment and 
the consequences of consenting or withholding consent.  If it is to be the case that a 
competent child is able to refuse consent to medical treatment, then that should be 
without regard to the motives behind that decision.  In the same way that the refusal 
of treatment by a competent adult is not subject to a requirement that such refusal 
be reasonable (however that reasonableness could be assessed), a competent child’s 
refusal of treatment should also be unfettered. 
 
Further, we do not consider that there is merit in following the approach taken in 
the United Kingdom, which enables a child to consent to medical treatment but 
allows a parent or guardian to override a refusal of treatment by a competent child.  
Despite the distinction between consent and refusal discussed above, and the added 
protection that medical ethics provides to the patient in the case of the former, it 
still should not be presumed that the best interests of the child will always favour 
administration of treatment rather than the absence of treatment.  This is particularly 
relevant where the treatment is to deal with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, the 
condition involved in Re A. 
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The consent/refusal dichotomy is particularly relevant in the context of transgender 
children, where the consequences of administering treatment, sometimes through 
procedures which have irreversible consequences and may render the patient infer-
tile, can be just as serious as the consequences of failing to administer treatment, 
which may result in grave psychological problems and result in the minor experi-
encing emotional problems and even exhibiting suicidal tendencies (as in Re Alex).  
For this reason, it is necessary to discuss the two issues considered above in the 
particular context of transgender and intersex children. 
 
 
C  The special nature of treatment for transgender and in-
tersex children 
Questions about the proper way of “treating” people with congenital adrenal hyper-
plasia, gender identity dysphoria and other similar “conditions” do not have easy 
answers.  Debate currently rages over whether intersex children should have their 
genitalia surgically altered to make their external appearance match their internal 
sexual organs.72  Despite increasing recognition that such procedures performed on 
small children can have devastating effects in later life, some parents continue to 
make the decision to subject their children to invasive and irreversible procedures in 
the interests of helping them to live more “normal” lives.73   
 
Allowing a parent or a court to override the consent of a competent child can, in the 
context of this kind of treatment, have very serious consequences.  It was consid-
ered by the English Court of Appeal in Re W that it would be unlikely that a doctor 
would perform an invasive procedure (e.g. an abortion) on a minor against the 
minor’s wishes, however it was indicated that an exception might arise where the 
procedure was clearly “in the child's best interests”.   
 
It is not beyond the realms of possibility that anxious parents of a child with am-
biguous sexual characteristics might wish their competent child to undergo hor-
mone therapy or even gender reassignment surgery, against the child’s wishes, and 
find a doctor willing to support their decision.  Although in Australia, as a result of 
the decision in Marion’s Case, it is unlikely that a parent would be able to consent 
to treatment of the nature of that proposed in Re A and Re Alex, the distinction 
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between therapeutic and non-therapeutic treatment endorsed by the courts leaves 
scope for a decision to be made by parents about treatment in circumstances which 
might be argued to be in the nature of treatment for a disease or illness and there-
fore therapeutic with the consequence that court consent would not be required. 
 
Even where the consent of the court is required, given the lack of public awareness 
in relation to transgender and intersex persons, it is possible that a court might 
consider such treatment to be in a child’s best interests even where the child refuses 
to consent to the procedure.  In relation to the treatment of intersex children, con-
cerns have been raised that cosmetic genital surgery is often performed for social 
and psychological reasons rather than being medically necessary.74 Although sur-
gery is often performed in the early years of a child's life, when there is no capacity 
to give consent, the case of Re A demonstrates that these issues are also of relevance 
to intersex young persons who may be developing the capacity to consent to medi-
cal treatment for themselves. 
 
One critic of the decision in Re A has pointed out the leap in logic that was made by 
the Court from the fact that A’s sexual preference was for females to the conclusion 
that A was intrinsically male.75  The same author draws attention to the absence of 
any discussion of the possibility that A may actually have been a lesbian, or even 
simply experiencing lesbian tendencies rather than truly identifying as a member of 
the opposite sex.76  In Re A the treatment that was eventually ordered included 
bilateral mastectomies, a hysterectomy and oophorectomy, unfolding of the clitoris, 
closure of the labia to create the appearance of a scrotum and the insertion of pros-
thetic testes.  In A’s case, the treatment eventually consented to by the court was in 
line with the minor’s wishes.  However, is it possible that a court might sanction 
treatment where the child is the only person who does not agree? 
 
It is suggested that further consideration should be given to these issues by courts 
considering cases in the nature of Re A and Re Alex, and indeed, by the legislature.  
Is proper weight and consideration being given to the circumstances of the children 
in these cases and their capacity to consent?  Or are the courts simply operating on 
the unspoken assumption that a child can never independently consent to treatment 
of this nature and consequently merely paying lip service to the ability of the child 
to consent to medical treatment?  If the latter, it is respectfully suggested that the 
courts elaborate on the circumstances in which children will never be capable of 
consenting to treatment and the rationale for such a decision.  Inevitably, circum-
stances will one day arise where a child in Alex’s or A’s position will quite clearly 
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possess the requisite intelligence and maturity to satisfy the Gillick test and the 
court will then, if the concerns we have addressed above are correct, be placed in 
the position of having to resile from its established endorsement of the Gillick 
principle. 
 
New South Wales legislation regulates the administering of certain “special medical 
treatment” on children, defined as persons under 16 years of age.  The Children and 
Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 prohibits a person from carrying out 
special medical treatment on a child other than with the consent of the NSW 
Guardianship Tribunal.  Special medical treatment is defined as meaning: 
• medical treatment that is intended or is reasonably likely to render a person 
permanently infertile (not including treatment that is intended to remediate 
a life-threatening condition and from which permanent infertility or the 
likelihood of it is an unwanted consequence); 
• any medical treatment involving the administration of a long-acting in-
jectable hormonal substance for the purpose of contraception or menstrual 
regulation; 
• any medical treatment in the nature of a vasectomy or tubal occlusion; or 
• any other medical treatment declared by the Regulations to be special 
medical treatment for the purposes of this section.77 
 
The Regulations further declare the following treatments to be special medical 
treatment: 
• any medical treatment involving the administration of a drug of addiction 
over a period of more than 10 days in any 30 day period; 
• any medical treatment involving an experimental procedure that does not 
conform to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involv-
ing Humans; or 
• any treatment involving the administration of a psychotropic drug to a 
child in out-of-home care for the purpose of controlling the child's behav-
iour.78 
 
The first three types of medical treatment referred to above are all kinds of medical 
treatment that might be involved in a gender reassignment or treatment preparatory 
to gender reassignment.  It is suggested that legislation along these lines at a Com-
monwealth level should be enacted to clarify the position in relation to child con-
sent if it is considered that minors should not be able to consent to procedures of 
this nature. 
 
By contrast, the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) 
provides that a person of or over 16 years of age may make decisions about her or 
his own medical treatment as validly and effectively as if that person were an 
adult.79  With respect to children under the age of 16, treatment can be administered 
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either where a parent or guardian consents or where the child consents and the 
medical practitioner is of the opinion that the child is capable of understanding the 
nature, consequences and risks and that the treatment is in the best interests of the 
child's health and well-being and that opinion is supported by the written opinion of 
at least one other medical practitioner who has personally examined the child.80  No 
distinction is drawn between ordinary medical treatment and special medical treat-
ment of the kind discussed above, meaning that hormonal therapy could be adminis-
tered to a child under the age of 16 against her or his will on the basis of the 
legislation. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Family Court in relation to the welfare of children derives 
from the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and is based on the powers contained in s 
51(xxi) (the marriage power) and s 51(xxii) (divorce and matrimonial causes) of the 
Constitution.81  To the extent that there is any inconsistency between the powers 
vested in the Family Court by federal legislation and restrictions on treatment 
contained in state legislation, the Family Court's powers will prevail by virtue of 
s 109 of the Constitution.82  This has the effect that the Family Court may authorise 
treatment with respect to a child even where the administration of that treatment 
would otherwise be unlawful under general state provisions.83  It is therefore neces-
sary that measures be taken to clarify the position at a federal level, to ensure that a 
consistent approach applicable to all jurisdictions is developed in relation to these 
issues. 
 
If it is to be the case that certain procedures for minors require the consent of a 
court or tribunal, then consideration needs to be given also to what is the most 
appropriate body to be making these types of decisions.  The kinds of issues in-
volved in these cases are complex and extend beyond medical considerations and 
the wishes and opinions of those immediately involved.  Ideally, the process for 
making decisions should take into account the broader experiences of those who 
have had the same experiences, and as much as possible take into consideration the 
range of options available to persons who identify as transgender or intersex.  A 
specialised tribunal might therefore be a more appropriate body for making such 
decisions than a court.84 
 
That is not to suggest, however, that it is appropriate for a court, or any other body, 
to make the ultimate decision where the child concerned is competent to decide for 
her or himself.  One commentator has suggested that where a child is found to be 
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competent, there should be no distinction drawn between the ability to consent to 
medical treatment and the ability to refuse consent to treatment.  However, an 
additional safeguard is proposed, namely that there be a requirement that the child 
provide an informed consent, a higher threshold test than that applied to adults.  
This is consistent with the Gillick test which requires of the minor a sufficient 
intelligence and maturity to understand fully the treatment that is proposed.85  The 
court’s role in such cases would be limited to ensuring that the minor is competent 
and has made an informed decision.86 
 
The authors consider that there is merit in this proposition.  Requiring a higher 
threshold test than that which adults must satisfy is consistent with a recognition of 
the fact that children generally lack the experience of adults in making difficult 
decisions and also takes into account the serious consequences that can result where 
invasive and irreversible procedures are carried out on children.  However, it also 
takes into account that minors, as they approach the age of majority, increase in 
maturity and that there may be little difference in capacity between a mature 15 or 
16-year-old and an 18-year-old.  
 
Ultimately, the procedures of the kinds addressed in Re A and Re Alex are special in 
that they are not simply for the purpose of curing an illness or improving health, but 
are inextricably associated with the patient's self-identity.  The consequences of not 
allowing treatment where that is sought or alternatively, of carrying out treatment 
where that is not wanted, can be terrible, having consequences lasting throughout a 
person's lifetime and affecting not only health, fertility and the ability to have a 
fulfilling sex life, but also psychological well-being and identity.  For these reasons, 
the authors consider that any test ultimately laid down by the courts or the legisla-
ture should be one which gives sufficient weight and consideration to the wishes of 
the minor involved. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The issues raised by Re Alex and Re A are of real significance.  Recently it was 
reported that Alan Finch, a 37-year-old man who had his penis and testicles ampu-
tated on the recommendation of psychiatrists at a state-funded Melbourne clinic but 
later reverted to being a male, is claiming damages against the Victorian govern-
ment and the doctors who work at the clinic.  He claims that the doctors followed a 
rigid ideology of treating gender identity problems by means of surgical interven-
tion without properly considering the possibility of psychotherapy or psychological 
approaches.87 
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Similarly, a number of congenital adrenal hyperplasia sufferers who underwent 
surgery as children have recently appeared before the San Francisco Human Rights 
Commission to testify about the effects that the surgery has had on them, including 
medical complications, suffering lack of sexual sensation and living lives of secrecy 
and shame.88 
 
These reports highlight the fact that there can be devastating consequences where 
irreversible procedures of this nature are performed without the consent of the 
person or where the patient has consented but subsequently changes her or his 
mind.  This is of particular significance when the patient is a child who, even where 
possessing sufficient intelligence and maturity to satisfy the Gillick test, may not 
have sufficient experience of life or awareness of the various ways of living a 
transgender or intersex life, to consent to irreversible treatment of this nature.  It 
remains for the courts or the legislature to clarify the limits, if any, on the operation 
of the Gillick principle in Australia, both generally and in the specific context of 
transgender and intersex children. 
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